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The Convention on the future of the European Union has been heralded by many as a unique
political setting. So far the process of EU Treaty change was subject to the collision of national
political interests in Intergovernmental Conferences. By contrast, the Convention appears to
promise a fundamentally open and normatively informed arena. This article probes the validity 
of this promise by dissecting the political dynamics of the Convention along three dimensions:
political behaviour and alliance formation; agenda management; and the norms informing its 
proceedings.
I: Introduction
The Convention on the future of the European Union was established by the 
European Council of Laeken in December 2001 and started its work two months
later. On 20 June 2003, the president of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,
former president of France, delivered the main conclusions of the Convention to
the European Council: a Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe to replace the
existing treaties of the European Communities and the European Union. The Euro-
pean Council (2003) has welcomed the work of the Convention as ‘a good basis
for starting in the Intergovernmental Conference’, which is the political forum that
eventually has to decide on Treaty changes.
Observers have suggested that the Convention may represent a qualitative change
in the European Treaty revision process (Hoffman, 2002). Whereas the Intergov-
ernmental Conferences (IGCs) are subject to diplomatic negotiations behind closed
doors, the Convention is considered to have brought the revision process into the
open. Parallel to this argument, it is claimed that, while interactions during the
IGC are best conceived as hard bargaining between the different national interests,
the Convention has facilitated a spirit of deliberation in which actors joined
together in the pursuit of shared understandings (Closa, 2003; Magnette, 2002).
In this article, an attempt is made to chart the political dynamics within the Con-
vention. Analyses of earlier Treaty revision processes have been dominated by the
dichotomy of intergovernmental bargaining versus supranational reasoning (see
Moravcsik, 1998 among others). One may wonder, however, whether these cate-
gories are still appropriate when it comes to analysing the peculiar institution of
the Convention. Instead, this article is informed by classical theories of political
behaviour, agenda management and power (Kingdon, 1995; Lukes, 1974). After a
short section on the basic set-up of the Convention by the European Council, the
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analysis first turns to the political behaviour of the actors in the Convention arena
and the alliances that were formed. Section 3 then examines the procedural organ-
isation of the Convention and the way in which its agenda was managed. Finally,
section 4 seeks to reconstruct the norms that developed in the process of the 
Convention.
II: The set-up of the Convention
In the Declaration of Laeken the European Council asserted that ‘The Union needs
to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient’ (European
Council, 2001). It established the European Convention with the task ‘to pave the
way for the next Intergovernmental Conference’ and ‘to consider the key issues
arising for the Union’s future development and try to identify the various possible
responses’. The European Council appointed Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (former pres-
ident of France) as the chairman of the Convention, and Guiliano Amato (former
prime minister of Italy) and Jean-Luc Dehaene (former prime minister of Belgium)
as vice-chairmen.
The European Council determined the composition of the Convention by defining
the number of representatives of its various components. In doing so it drew on
the example of the earlier Convention that in 2000 had drafted the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and which had involved representatives of national govern-
ments together with national and European parliamentarians and a European
Commissioner. In the new Convention all Member States were guaranteed three
members, one chosen by the head of state or government and two representing
the national parliaments. One notable innovation was that also all 13 accession
candidate countries were invited to send a similar representation to the European
Convention. Of the European institutions the European Commission was invited
to send two representatives to the Convention. The European Parliament was given
16 seats. Moreover, apart from the chairs, each member of the Convention could
be replaced by an alternate. Thus total membership of the Convention came to 105
full members and 102 alternates.
The European Council also provided for a praesidium that, as a kind of steering
group, was to ‘lend impetus and [to] provide the Convention with an initial
working basis’ (European Council, 2001). The praesidium was made up of the three
chairmen and two representatives of all institutional groups, except for the gov-
ernment representatives who were represented by the three states that were to
hold the EU presidency over the period of the Convention’s deliberations (Spain,
Denmark and Greece). At the request of the candidate countries, a representative
from those countries (the Slovene parliamentarian Alojz Peterle) was later added
as an invitee to the praesidium.
III: Political behaviour and alliances
Whereas the European Council determined the composition of the Convention in
terms of institutional background, it did not stipulate anything concerning the com-
position of the delegations of the European institutions, either in terms of politi-
cal affiliation or of nationality (cf. Closa, 2003, s. 2; Shaw, 2003, 57 ff.). As it turned
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out, five Member States and the accession countries saw their presence in the Con-
vention limited to three full members. On the other hand, France was represented
by seven full members and the other three big Member States (Germany, the
United Kingdom and Italy) by six.
Looking at political affiliations, the two dominant political movements in Europe,
the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, also dominated the Conven-
tion. Each of them accounted for more than a third of the full members from the
present EU Member States. With seven full members, the Liberal Democrats turned
out to be the biggest of the smaller party groups. With four full members, the Union
for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) was also rather well represented in com-
parison with its share in the European Parliament. On the other hand, the Greens
and the United Left (GUE/NGL) got a relatively poor deal.
The presence of alternate members helped however to secure a greater diversity
of political affiliations in the Convention. Indeed, as it soon turned out, alternates
often contributed actively to the proceedings. Participation of the alternates of the
representatives of the governments and of the Commission was generally premised
on the absence of the full members. However, on the parliamentarian sides many
alternates engaged as much in the debate as their full members. This was of par-
ticular importance in the case of national parliamentarians, where in the majority
of Member States the full memberships were shared between the Social Democ-
rats and the Christian Conservatives. In turn the presence of parties like the Greens,
the GUE/NGL and the UEN relied much on the alternate delegates.
Since each member of the Convention had a triple allegiance – institutional back-
ground, nationality and party affiliation – the Convention did not automatically
split up along clear political lines; individual members could in principle choose
how to align themselves depending on the issue. In practice, Convention members
joined in alliances to submit contributions and, in the final stage of the Conven-
tion, to draft amendments to the proposed articles of the Constitutional Treaty. An
analysis of the coalitions reveals a number of interesting patterns.1 Notably, the
political behaviour of government representatives followed fundamentally differ-
ent patterns from that of the (national and European) parliamentarians in the 
Convention.
Government representatives engaged little or not at all with their party-political
groups. Typically, government representatives submitted most of their contribu-
tions on their own or only co-signed by their alternate. Some government repre-
sentatives would co-ordinate their actions with the parliamentarians of their own
nationality, in some cases limited to those that were part of the government 
coalition.
The most powerful coalitions were, however, the ones in which government rep-
resentatives joined forces. In the course of the Convention, clear patterns emerged
distinguishing the more integrationist from the more intergovernmentalist gov-
ernments. There was also a clear difference in the way these patterns evolved
between the big and the smaller Member States.
From the start of the Convention there were clear differences between the prior-
ities of the big Member States, with Germany leaning more to the federal end of
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the spectrum, the UK tending to a more intergovernmental approach and France
taking a somewhat mixed position in the middle (Crum, 2003). A clear split
emerged, however, when in autumn 2003 the French and German governments
used the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty to engage in a close
collaboration. Together they published four joint papers on Convention topics cul-
minating with a joint paper on institutional affairs (CONV488/03).2 The split was
deepened as this much-criticised paper coincided with the two governments taking
issue, in the name of Europe, with the US approach to Iraq. Soon enough the
Franco-German coalition confronted a British-Hispanic coalition (CONV591/03)
that later expanded to include the Poles and seven smaller (Member and Acces-
sion) States (CONV766/03).
While the big Member States became entangled in their political disagreements,
the smaller Member States were actively forging coalitions to make their own
mark. Initially the Benelux states, pushing rather integrationist positions, played a
leading role. Following upon their initiatives, 18 smaller states united behind Lux-
embourg prime minister Jean-Claude Juncker who acted as their spokesman at the
April 2003 meeting of the European Council with the Convention president. This
coalition included all the smaller states except for the most intergovernmentalist
ones, Denmark and Sweden. By the end of the Convention the point of gravity
among the smaller states tilted away from the Benelux position, as the small states
in the middle of the spectrum (Finland, Portugal and Austria) defined a joint posi-
tion with the more intergovernmentalist ones and the Accession States (except for
big Poland and integrationist Romania) (CONV646/03).
Contrary to the government representatives, parliamentarians (of both European
and national level) in the Convention heavily relied on party-political groups (cf.
Fumerio, 2003, ch. 3). Members of the European Parliament (EP) generally took
the lead. Most notably the caucus of the European Christian Democrats chaired by
German MEP Elmar Brok operated in many cases en bloc. Drawing not only upon
the 12-piece Christian Democratic delegation but also upon national parliamen-
tarians from both Member States and Accession States, Brok regularly succeeded
in summoning more than 30 like-minded conventioneers for his amendments.
The Social Democratic caucus was considerably less organised. One reason for this
was the fact that the Social Democratic delegation had elected Convention vice-
chairman Guiliano Amato as its chair. Amato’s position restrained him from mobil-
ising political movements in the Convention. More often than not, the Social
Democratic MEPs acted in ad hoc sub-coalitions of two or three members only. The
engagement with national parliamentarians of Social Democratic persuasion also
took place in a more ad hoc manner. While some became closely associated with
the Social Democratic EP delegation, others preferred to operate outside of the
party-group framework.
All other political groups had only one full member in the EP delegation. Of these
the Liberal Democrats best succeeded in mobilising themselves as a group under
the thoughtful and experienced guidance of British MEP Andrew Duff. The Green
delegation was much less visible as a group. Markedly, its most prominent member,
German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, did not become engaged in party-
political contributions. Austrian MEP Johannes Voggenhuber and the various
4 BEN CRUM
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Green parliamentarians from the national level rallied together on a number of
issues, most notably involving the environment, services of the general interest
and the future of the Euratom Treaty. On some occasions the Greens also forged
coalitions with the regionalists of the European free alliance with whom they form
an integrated political group in the European Parliament. The various members of
political parties associated with the UEN and the GUE/NGL operated mostly on
their own.
Possibly the most conspicuous example of political mobilisation could be found at
the Convention fringes where an ad hoc coalition emerged of left-leaning MEPs,
extreme right Danish parliamentarians, British Conservatives and some opposition
members from the Accession States. From the very start of the Convention, these
eurosceptic members co-operated on a number of contributions and eventually
their co-operation led to the drafting of the alternative report (CONV773/03, also
included in CONV851/03).
IV: Agenda management by the Convention praesidium
Political manoeuvring and coalescing explain only some of the results achieved by
the Convention. The majority of alliances in the Convention were formed in
response to the proposals put before it. Looking back at the end of the Conven-
tion, Giscard d’Estaing (2003) commented: ‘If you allow me, I would like to reveal
to you one of the recipes of our success, namely the good use of time’. Indeed from
the very beginning of the Convention, Giscard d’Estaing had taken control over its
timing and the agenda. In this effort, a crucial role was played by the three phases
he had proposed for the Convention’s work: a listening phase, a study phase and
a recommendation phase (Giscard d’Estaing, 2002, 8 ff.). The distinction between
these phases provided Giscard d’Estaing with an argument to allow issues to appear
on the Convention’s agenda only in due course.
Agenda management was much needed since, given the wide-ranging character of
the Declaration of Laeken, a whole lot of interests and views struggled for access
to the Convention’s agenda. This process was reinforced by the civil society forum
that the Laeken European Council had set up as well. However, the strongest exter-
nal pressures came from the national capitals where, ever since Joschka Fischer’s
speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, national political leaders had been
shaping their views on the future of the European Union (Crum, 2003). Most
notable was the proposal to replace the rotating EU presidency by a permanent
Chair of the European Council, which was vigorously advocated by the British and
French governments.
In any case, the Convention agenda was well protected against the random influx
of proposals. All agendas of the plenary sessions and all proposals to be submitted
were first discussed by the Convention praesidium. And as much as the praesid-
ium guarded the gates of the plenary, Giscard d’Estaing guarded the gates of the
praesidium. Working in close tandem with the secretariat’s head, former British
diplomat Sir John Kerr, Giscard d’Estaing controlled the working methods of the
praesidium (CONV9/02, Art. 6.8) and its agenda. Giscard d’Estaing’s control was
reinforced by the strict confidentiality of the praesidium and the loyalty instilled
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in its members. Typically, it was already decided early on that ‘in order not to
undermine the role of the praesidium, its members rather than circulating indi-
vidual contributions, would submit suggestions to the praesidium’ (Summary of
praesidium meeting, 15 April 2002, p. 1).
Carlos Closa’s nice characterisation of the Convention’s process as a ‘to and fro pro-
cedure’ goes to underline the importance of the substance and timing of the pro-
posals submitted to the plenary: ‘Debate starts with an issue from a paper submitted
by the praesidium, stock is taken of opinions and summarised and, again debate
starts from this new point’ (Closa, 2003, p. 18). In the listening phase of the Con-
vention work, which lasted from February until July 2002, working documents
drafted by the Convention secretariat provided the basis for the debates. From
summer 2002 onwards, work in the study phase was dominated by the working
groups, the last of which submitted its report for plenary debate in February 2003.
Although the working groups allowed for more open and smaller-scale discussions
than the plenary, here also the praesidium members guaranteed structure and focus
by acting as chairs and ensuring that the working group would remain loyal to 
the mandate that the praesidium had defined for it. As working group chairs, the
praesidium members were also responsible for the drafting of the working group
reports.
Throughout the Convention there were several attempts from the floor to get a
grip on the agenda. The most important examples were the early requests for the
establishment of working groups, the pressure on the praesidium to come forward
with a first draft of the end-product (CONV 181/02) and the request for a Working
Group on Social Europe (CONV 300/02). Giscard d’Estaing would resist giving the
initiative away. In a first response the chair would avoid a direct confrontation with
the requests and refer them to the praesidium. The deferring of a response sufficed
in some cases to render it obsolete. This strategy failing, the chair would seize the
initiative by forging the request to its own preferences. Thus the request for
working groups was met eventually by a proposal by the praesidium for a first
round of Working Groups on 10 particular issues.
The praesidium approached each new phase of the Convention with great caution.
One crucial turning point for the Convention came in late October 2002, when
Giscard d’Estaing unveiled the ‘skeleton’ of the draft Constitutional Treaty
(CONV369/02), which basically provided a table of contents wherein each topic
was assigned its place. The next turning point was the presentation of the first draft
articles on competences (arts. 7–15, eventually arts. 11–17). Here, both the 
anxieties and the political differences within the praesidium came to the fore when
the initial presentation in the praesidium met with fundamental objections, espe-
cially from the side of the Commission representatives. Eventually, it took four
praesidium meetings to reach an agreement, forcing Giscard d’Estaing to postpone
their presentation to the plenary for one session.
Still, from that moment onwards, the draft articles came out in a steady stream,
engaging the Convention members in an intense and tightly paced working
process. Convention meetings were convened every three weeks or so and while
one batch was discussed a new batch would already be presented. Relying on the
transmission speed allowed by the Internet, draft texts would be made available as
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soon as possible to all Convention members. They were then invited to draft
amendments. Amendments were processed by the Convention secretariat that
posted them on the Internet, accompanied by a memo that bundled them in logical
order and provided a summary of the main threads encountered.
Overall, no less than 5995 amendments were tabled to the praesidium draft arti-
cles. Notably, however, few attempts were made to raise fundamental challenges
to the very way the draft Constitutional Treaty was set up and the choices that
were made in addressing certain issues and omitting others. Instead amendments
generally took the draft texts as their point of departure, commenting upon them
and calling for some passages to be deleted and other things to be added. Part of
this may be explained by the quality of the texts proposed, but it must also be
partly accounted for by the (time) constraints that were imposed upon the Con-
vention members.
Throughout the drafting process the praesidium made sure that it retained the 
initiative on the drafting and the revision of the articles. Instead of immediately
following up on each plenary debate, a fully revised set of articles of Part I was
presented only after all had been discussed (CONV724/03), so that the draft Con-
stitutional Treaty could also be appraised as a whole.
On the particularly sensitive issue of the future institutional organisation, Giscard
d’Estaing personally controlled the drafting of the articles. Their eventual release,
late April 2003, deviated markedly from the strict routines thus far. The day before
they were due to be presented in the praesidium, the draft articles on institutions
reached the French newspaper Le Monde. The press coverage provoked a strong
reaction among the Convention members and a particularly sharp critique of the
Commission. The next day in the praesidium, Giscard d’Estaing was forced to
amend his original proposals on some key points. Obviously there was no possi-
bility to have them thoroughly revised as they were also keenly awaited by the
plenary of the following day. Indeed, with the Convention’s deadline approaching
in less than two months, a further postponement of these draft articles would have
put the Convention in a really difficult situation.
V: The normative self-understanding of the Convention
At the deepest level, political behaviour within the Convention was conditioned
by the norms under which it operated. Given the unique character of the Con-
vention, these norms were far from determined at the start. Yet in key aspects, the
very positioning of the Convention by the Laeken Declaration already conditioned
the normative self-understanding of the Convention by defining its mission to
‘pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly
as possible ... it will be the task of that Convention to consider the key issues arising
for the Union’s future development and try to identify the various possible
responses’ (European Council, 2001).
From the very start of the Convention, many of its members (parliamentarians
above all) aspired to transcend the shadow of the IGC. This aspiration was picked
up by Giscard d’Estaing who, while noting that the Laeken Declaration left the
Convention the choice between submitting either a single text or various options,
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imprinted it upon the Convention that ‘our recommendation would carry consid-
erable weight and authority if we could manage to achieve broad consensus on a single
proposal which we could all present. If we were to reach consensus on this point, we
would thus open the way towards a Constitution for Europe’ (Giscard d’Estaing, 2002, 
p. 11, original emphasis). Thus Giscard d’Estaing underlined from the very start
two fundamental norms of the Convention: the commitment to establishing a con-
sensus and the orientation towards a single text of a constitutional character.
Pursuing this line of argument, Giscard d’Estaing translated this understanding into
a particular Convention ethos: ‘this Convention cannot succeed if it is only a place
for expressing divergent opinions. It needs to become the melting pot in which,
month by month, a common approach is worked out ... in order to think about
what proposals we can make, the members of the Convention will have to turn
towards each other and gradually foster a Convention spirit’ (Giscard d’Estaing, 2002,
p. 13, original emphasis).
For one thing, the ‘Convention spirit’ left little space for voting as a decision-
making procedure in the Convention. Recognising the fundamental qualitative dif-
ferences between the interests represented, it would be inappropriate to assign
equal votes to the representatives of, for instance, the German government, the
Maltese parliament and the European Commission. At the same time, any attempt
to assign weights to the different votes was bound to remain open to challenge. In
any case a simple majority would not do, as the Convention was aiming to reach
its conclusions by a consensus. For these reasons, Giscard d’Estaing determined
from the very start that there would be no voting in the Convention. Instead the
Convention would work towards a common proposal until the moment at which
the president would declare a consensus to have been reached.
While fundamental cleavages were thus discouraged from revealing themselves in
the Convention, much was done to reaffirm the joint ‘Convention spirit’. One way
in which the Convention spirit found expression was through what Paul Magnette
has called the ‘de-legitimisation of “situated interests” ’: ‘although they undeniably
defend “particular interests”, the members usually present their arguments 
as impartial views, abstract reasoning seeking to define the “common good” ’ 
(Magnette, 2002). A second major characteristic of the Convention spirit, also iden-
tified by Magnette (2003), is the preference for technical legal arguments (argu-
ments of legal simplification in particular) over arguments of power (threats) and
over arguments of ideological principles. Whereas arguments of the latter kinds
might have emphasised division lines, the legal approach provided a neutral
common ground and allowed for a mode of de-politicised argument.
The focus on constitutional issues contributed to the Convention’s sense of unity
and the strengthening of its members’ autonomy vis-à-vis their constituencies. The
impact of the Convention’s norms differed, however, for its various components.
Among the governments, some (e.g. Finland, the Netherlands) had initially sought
to underline the preparatory character of the Convention, insisting that the real
decisions could only be taken at the IGC. However, no government representative
could turn the tide of the Convention and, like UK Minister for Europe Peter Hain,
they soon realised that active engagement – rather than non-committal – was the
best way to make a mark.
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Although the forced engagement of the government representatives may be 
considered a success for the parliamentary majority in the Convention, they also
had to pay a price. The Convention spirit suppressed the representation of party-
ideological and national interests. What is more, the Convention also revealed that
political ideologies do not necessarily define a consistent party line on the consti-
tutional future of the EU. Notably it was the Christian Democrats and the Liberal
Democrats who found themselves most at home in the context of the Convention.
The Social Democrats had a much harder time in accommodating themselves to
the Convention spirit. The smaller political groups further left along the political
spectrum (the Greens and the United Left) had even more difficulties in distin-
guishing themselves, especially as they were split between constructive radicals and
eurosceptics on principle. At the fringes of the Convention, members could be
found who were unwilling to yield to the self-understanding of the Convention
mainstream. Eventually eight of them submitted an alternative report (initially
called ‘minority report’) to the European Council (CONV851/03, pp. 21–24).
After the Convention spirit was fostered to develop in the listening phase, it oper-
ated in full swing in the study phase with the work being done in the working
groups. As the Convention moved towards its recommendations, several factors
indicated for many the end of the Convention spirit and the beginning of a proto-
IGC, dominated by national interests and hard bargaining. Most visible was the
appearance in November 2002 of the French and German foreign ministers,
Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fischer, in the Convention. Although their
membership was initially welcomed, many Convention members felt offended
when the ministers only turned up at the Convention meetings to present their
views and did not really engage with the debates. Nevertheless, regardless of the
entrance of de Villepin and Fischer, it was unlikely that the spirit of the study phase
could be preserved when it came to the actual drafting of recommendations, par-
ticularly since the most contentious debate, the one on institutions, had deliber-
ately been kept off the agenda of the study phase.
Still, even if negotiations toughened up, the praesidium managed to avoid major
political clashes and it held to its commitment to avoid voting. To succeed in this,
the praesidium (strongly supported by the secretariat) made an enormous effort to
consider the thousands of amendments tabled by the Convention members on its
draft articles. When the consolidated revised version of Part I of the draft Consti-
tutional Treaty was published as a whole by the end of May 2003 (CONV724/03),
extensive reasoning was provided for the choices made. Throughout the process
the praesidium showed itself quite willing to revise its texts. On more radical pro-
posals, however, it often found that there were strong voices ‘for’ and ‘against’,
allowing it to stick to its original proposals as rather well-balanced compromises.
Also the praesidium generally waited to abandon an earlier proposal until the
moment where it was certain that a stable alternative could be established. Thus,
the praesidium avoided engaging itself in a continuous revision process.
In the final phase, the government and parliamentary representatives adopted
strikingly different strategies. Government representatives pursued a limited 
strategy and focused their attention on specific issues, mostly involving policies
(rather than institutions) that they considered to be of particular national interest.
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Notably, at this point some of them unashamedly flagged issues on which they
insisted their nation could never compromise. On the other hand, the parliamen-
tarians closed ranks, realising that as the Convention was about to deliver its work
to the IGC, it was crucial to maintain a united front. Each of the two parliamen-
tary components (national and European) sought to define a limited number of
outstanding priorities that were then co-ordinated between the two groups and
issued as joint memos.
Nevertheless, the main Convention achievements had already been secured. The
only task remaining for the praesidium was to keep everyone on board. It was
committed to hold on to the compromises reached and only yielded on a limited
number of issues. The representatives of the bigger Member States got some spe-
cific but important concessions on certain competences. The wishes of the parlia-
mentarians were long resisted but were eventually met to some degree. Thus, the
praesidium succeeded in accommodating the many different views of the Con-
vention, paving the way for Giscard d’Estaing who declared the consensus on the
draft Constitutional Treaty on 13 June 2003.
VI: Conclusion
This article has not attempted to make a complete analysis of the politics of the
Convention. Instead, it has sought to demonstrate that a proper understanding of
the proceedings of the Convention requires an appreciation of the various dimen-
sions of the politics at work: political behaviour, agenda management and norma-
tive structuring. Most striking perhaps is that the Convention’s self-understanding
pushed conventional party-ideological cleavages to the background and even sup-
pressed national differences over the ultimate telos of the European Union. That
is not to say that political differences did not matter. The efficacy of the Conven-
tion’s norms and its agenda-management process was very much predicated on the
careful handling of the political cleavages present in the Convention.
One may say that the Convention has managed to convert antagonistic power rela-
tions (power over) in a joint capacity to act (power to).3 In more contemporary
language, one would say that the Convention has replaced the logic of bargaining
with that of deliberation and has thus been able to avoid the deadlocks in which
earlier IGCs had been caught. Indeed, as the final section demonstrated, the very
contrast with the IGC has had a strong influence upon the work of the Conven-
tion and its capacity to forge a consensus.
Typically, at the final Convention meeting, president Giscard d’Estaing (2003) 
symbolically thanked the half-turtle-half-dragon porcelain statue, nicknamed
‘Wukei’, that he had used as a mascot along the way, saying, ‘And I expect, as
many of you probably believe, that, since the beginning, she knew where she
wanted to go!’ Yet a too-deterministic and too-celebratory view of the Convention
should be avoided. The Convention has made fundamental decisions where alter-
natives were available and might have been justified as well. While the draft Con-
stitutional Treaty may eventually serve many interests, it is bound to disadvantage
others, particularly those strongly attached to national, rather than European,
interests. From that perspective, the Convention method only marginally improves
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upon the IGC by casting the political dynamics in a different format. Whatever its
merits, the normative reading of the Convention should not be inflated to conceal
the underlying differences in political interests between political actors at the EU
level.
Notes
This research has been made possible by the support of a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Com-
munity under contract number HPMF-CT-2002-01706. I thank Marco Incerti and two anonymous ref-
erees for comments on an earlier draft and Kathleen King for editorial help.
1 The following analysis of political alliances is based upon a preliminary analysis of all 386 contribu-
tions and 5,995 amendments to the Convention. At this stage, preference is given to a qualitative
presentation. A quantitative presentation would in any case have difficulties in bearing out the 
qualitative differences between contributions.
2 All documents published by the Convention are referred to by their official CONV-number. They are
accessible online at <http://european-convention.eu.int>.
3 Compare Steven Lukes’s (1974, s. 5) critique of Hannah Arendt’s concept of power.
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